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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-4355 
___________ 
 
MEL M. MARIN, PERSONALLY AND AS HEIR OF THE 
ESTATE OF MILIVOJ AND EVA MARINKOVIC 
 
v. 
 
LA PALOMA HEALTHCARE CENTER AND ITS ALTER EGOS; 
ITALIAN MAPLE HOLDINGS, LLC; PLUM HEALTHCARE GROUP; 
MARK BALLIF; PAUL HUBBARD; ORVILLE LLOYD MARLETT; 
GRUPO TELEVISIA A FOREIGN CORPORATION, AND ITS ALTER EGOS, 
doing business as XETV SAN DIEGO 6 TELEVISION; 
JEANE LENORE MARLETT TRUST; EMILIO AZCARRAGA JEAN; 
GUSTAVO CISNEROS; ALFANSO DE ANGOITIA; BERNARDO GOMEZ 
MARTINEZ; MICHAEL RICHTER JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY 
 
        Mel M. Marvin, Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 11-cv-00230) 
District Judge:  Honorable David S. Cercone 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 10, 2015 
Before: FUENTES, KRAUSE and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed:  January 8, 2016) 
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_________ 
 
OPINION* 
_________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Mel M. Marin appeals from an order of the United States District Court for the 
Western District of Pennsylvania, which dismissed his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).  We will affirm the District Court’s judgment. 
 In October 2011, Marin submitted to the District Court a lengthy complaint 
including “causes of action for conversion, fraud and deceit, assault and battery, section 
1983 civil rights, interference with business, intentional infliction of emotional distress, 
defamation, invasion of privacy, and wrongful death.”  Dist. Ct. Mem. Op. at 1.  Along 
with his complaint, Marin filed a motion to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP”).  The 
docket does not reflect any activity until September 29, 2014, when the Court granted 
Marin’s IFP motion, but also dismissed the complaint “pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for lack of jurisdiction, forum non-conveniens, and as otherwise based 
on fanciful allegations and indisputably meritless legal theory.”  Dist. Ct. Order at 1-2.  
The Court also stated that it found “that the action is vexatious and was filed for 
vindictive and obstructive purposes.”  Id. at 2.  Marin timely appealed. 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we exercise plenary review of a  
district court decision dismissing a complaint as frivolous or for failure to state a claim.  
Roman v. Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 194 (3d Cir. 1990); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 
223 (3d Cir. 2000).  A complaint fails to state a claim if, accepting all well-pled factual 
allegations as true, the allegations do not “plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.”  
Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 365 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 
662, 675 (2009)).  We may affirm a district court for any reason supported by the record.  
Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 191 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).1 
 We agree with the District Court that Marin’s complaint “fails to state a claim 
upon which relief can be granted,” because the District Court “lacks jurisdiction over the 
defendants.”  Dist. Ct. Mem. Op. at 9.2  Marin argues that, at least as to the libel claim, 
his complaint states a claim upon which relief could be granted.  But even if we credit the 
allegations of his complaint, those allegations are insufficient to demonstrate that the 
nonresident Defendants “maintained systematic and continuous contacts with the forum 
                                              
1 As explained below, we agree that the District Court lacked personal jurisdiction over 
the Defendants.  We note, however, that to the extent the District Court sought to dismiss 
the complaint for failure to prosecute, the dismissal would have been premature, as the 
complaint was not due to be served until the Court ruled on Marin’s application to 
proceed IFP.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(c)(3) (if plaintiff is granted privilege of proceeding 
IFP, District Court must enter an order “that service be made by a United States marshal 
or deputy marshal or by a person specially appointed by the court”); see also Roman v. 
Jeffes, 904 F.2d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 1990) (“the appropriate time to make a decision to 
dismiss a case pursuant to § 1915(d) [now § 1915(e)] is before service of a complaint”). 
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state,” Kehm Oil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 537 F.3d 290, 300 (3d Cir. 2008) (discussing 
general personal jurisdiction), or that they “purposefully directed [their] activities at a 
resident of the forum,”  Gen. Elec. Co. v. Deutz AG, 270 F.3d 144, 150 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(internal quotation marks omitted) (describing requirements for establishing specific 
personal jurisdiction).  The complaint states that the Defendants, who are not 
Pennsylvania residents, published the allegedly defamatory statements in California and 
does not indicate that the Defendants were in any way involved in re-publishing the 
information in Pennsylvania.3  Given the lack of a connection between the Defendants 
and Pennsylvania, apparent from the face of the complaint, the District Court properly 
dismissed the complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction.4     
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.    
                                                                                                                                                 
2 Given our holding, we have not examined Marin’s other litigation to determine whether 
his current complaint is sufficiently repetitive and vexatious to warrant dismissal on that 
basis. 
3 Marin does not explain how any of his other counts have a connection with 
Pennsylvania.  
4 While a district court generally must give the plaintiff an opportunity to amend a 
complaint before dismissing it for failure to state a claim, opportunity to amend is not 
required if, as here, amendment would be futile.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 
293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002). 
 
